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Abstract
Current account deficits and housing prices showed a strong positive correlation
throughout the mid-90s to 2007. This paper studies the effect of a decrease in the
international interest rate and in the downpayment requirement to buy a house during
that period on the joint behavior of the current account and housing prices. To this end,
I build a small open economy model with life-cycle heterogeneous agents and two goods:
tradable (non-housing) and non-tradable (housing). I calibrate the model to replicate
selected aggregate statistics of the U.S. economy and compute the transition after the
decrease in the interest rate and in the downpayment. The model is able to match some
relevant facts: the boom and the bust (after 2007) in the housing market, where the
bust, as the data show, occurs without a reversal in the interest rate; the increase in the
homeownership rate; the simultaneous boom - and bust - in non-housing consumption;
and the coexistence of borrowing from abroad with a current account deficit throughout
the transition.
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1 Introduction
“In my view... it is impossible to understand this crisis without a reference to
the global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the
1990s.”
Ben S. Bernanke (2009)
Current account deficits and housing prices were positively correlated between the mid-90s
and 2007.1 This period was characterized by: first, the magnitude of housing market booms
compared with previous experiences, as shown by Andre´ (2010); and second, the existence of
global imbalances,2 a particular event of this period of time.
Before the Great Recession of 2007-08, housing market booms had been characterized by
unprecedented increases in residential investment (Figure 1), housing prices (Figure 2), and
homeownership rates (Figure 3). Afterwards, a reversal in all these variables characterized
the housing bust period. In addition, a decrease in current account deficits took place (Figure
4) together with the bust (after 2007) in housing markets.
Simultaneously, long-term interest rates have been decreasing over time (Figure 5). Ca-
ballero et al. (2008) or Mendoza et al. (2009) study, under different hypotheses, the coexistence
of low interest rates and global imbalances in the world economy. They address how a huge
amount of savings coming from different regions emerged in the international capital markets
during the 90’s depressing international interest rates.3 As Caballero et al. (2008) claim, the
long-run real interest rate has been steadily declining over the last decade despite the efforts
from central banks to raise interest rates - the so called “Greenspan’s Conundrum”.
In this paper, I develop a theory of housing boom and bust with the following ingredients:
small open economy, to analyze shocks to the international interest rate; life-cycle heteroge-
neous agents model with housing tenure decisions, in order to account for the extensive margin
1See Punzi (2007), Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009), Andre´ (2010), Gete (2010), or Ferrero (2011) for this
evidence in OECD, non-OECD, or emerging economies.
2Global imbalances are large and persistent current account deficits run by some countries (e.g. the U.S.,
Spain) and, simultaneously, current account surpluses in other countries (e.g. Japan, Germany, emerging Asia,
some oil exporting countries). See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010).
3As the “saving glut” hypothesis (Bernanke (2005)) suggests.
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increase in housing demand (homeownership rate); and residential land, modeled following
Davis and Heathcote (2005), and needed to produce new houses. As Davis and Heathcote
(2007) show for the U.S. between 1970 and 2003, land governs housing price dynamics.
Two channels fuel a housing boom in this environment: cheap credit and financial inno-
vation. Both of them are taken as given in the model. The first channel translates into a
decreasing international interest rate. The second channel is institutional. Strong financial
innovation (the development of housing equity withdrawal, subprime loans, the development
of securitization), liberalization in mortgage markets, and government support to increase the
homeownership rate, resulted in a decrease in the downpayment requirement to buy a house in
the U.S.4 Table 1 shows this evidence for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in the U.S. for different
years. These data refer to LTV ratios for first time home-buyers, namely, the marginal buyers
most affected by borrowing constraints.
A housing boom in this model, after a decrease in the interest rate and in the downpayment
requirement to buy a house, implies an increase in housing demand - at both margins -,
together with an increase in real house prices and labor used in the construction sector. The
decrease in the downpayment requirement to buy a house makes it possible for some renters
to become homeowners. The economy borrows from abroad because borrowing is cheaper
(due to the decrease in the interest rate) and because more expensive houses are used as
collateral against international borrowing. This increase in borrowing from abroad produces a
current account deficit. The economy also moves labor from the tradable (non-housing) to the
non-tradable (housing) sector, and runs a trade deficit to fulfill the demand for non-housing
consumption. As time goes by, and households start to reach their desired stock of housing,
the demand for new houses cools down, putting less pressure on new residential land and
decreasing housing prices and labor in construction: a bust in the housing market ensues.
Non-housing consumption decreases for two reasons: the economy must repay its debt; and
the decrease in housing prices makes homeowners poorer than before. This is consistent with
a boom in non-housing consumption and its bust. Moreover, the bust in the economy happens
without a reversal in low interest rates. Thus, the model also provides some insights for the
bust period based on fundamentals.
The modeling strategy for the boom period is in line with Garriga et al. (2012) and
Kiyotaki et al. (2011). These papers also find large effects on housing prices of a decrease in
the international interest rate in small open economy models calibrated to the U.S. economy.
Garriga et al. (2012) develop a representative agent model in which relaxed financial conditions
4See for example Chambers et al. (2009), Doms and Krainer (2007), or Green and Wachter (2005).
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and a decline in the world interest rate lead housing prices dynamics. Kiyotaki et al. (2011)
focus their analysis on the welfare effects of changes in the international interest rate across
net buyers and net sellers of houses. Kiyotaki et al. (2011) use an OLG structure but they
depart from a law of motion for land as in Davis and Heathcote (2005), which allows my
model to qualitatively replicate the behavior of the U.S. economy during the bust period,
so that my model is consistent with the development of housing market and the behavior
of the current account. As Kiyotaki et al. (2011) show in an OLG framework, a relaxation
of the downpayment requirement plays almost no role in house price dynamics. Justiniano
et al. (2013) document how relaxed borrowing standards would not be consistent with the
spike in the ratio of mortgages to the value of real estate during the housing bust as the data
show. In this respect, an OLG structure would be consistent with this dimension of the U.S.
data. This result is in line with alternative calibrations and is also consistent with the results
presented in the literature by Iacoviello and Neri (2010), who find negligible effects on house
price dynamics of a shock to the LTV ratio.
The effects identified in the literature are also qualitatively similar to those in Justiniano et
al. (2014a), where the focus is on the interaction between borrowing and lending constraints.
The model is built on Iacoviello (2005) with different levels of impatience between borrowers
and savers/lenders. In this environment, savers face a lending constraint and the results,
qualitatively consistent with different dimensions of the U.S. data, come from a relaxation
of this lending constraint (credit supply shock) and not from a relaxation of the borrowing
constraint.
Adam et al. (2011), Ferrero (2011), and Justiniano et al. (2014b) also focus their analysis
on the correlation between current account deficits and house price dynamics. Adam et al.
(2011) depart from the assumption of rational expectations in an asset pricing model with
learning. The sharp increase in house prices is due to the presence of agents with subjective
beliefs about future prices. Both, Ferrero (2011) and Justiniano et al. (2014b), are built on
Iacoviello (2005). Ferrero (2011) frames his analysis within a two-country model with one
representative international saver lending to one representative borrower in the U.S.; while
Justiniano et al. (2014b) evaluate the interaction of the saving glut and the banking glut on
the U.S. economy.
Finally, also connecting current account deficits to the housing market boom before the
financial crisis, Favilukis et al. (2013) find no effect of purchases of government debt by for-
eigners on housing prices when laying down easier financial conditions in a general equilibrium
framework with idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete markets. They find that the reduction
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in the risk-free rate prompted by the flow of international capital into the U.S. economy is
compensated by the increase in the housing risk premia because of the reallocation in the
domestic agents’ portfolio prompted by the foreign purchases of safe assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model economy is presented in Section
2. In Section 3, the benchmark model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Simulations are
performed and discussed in Section 4, and a brief summary concludes the paper in Section 5.
2 The Model Economy
I investigate a life-cycle small open economy model populated by heterogeneous agents with
three sectors of production. The model strategy follows Gervais (2002), Dı´az and Luengo-
Prado (2008), and Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2010), who study different issues of the demand
for housing in life-cycle closed economies. The main differences stem from the focus of this
paper on the ability of an open economy to run a trade deficit; in the feature that housing
consumption is considered as a non-tradable good and non-housing consumption as a tradable
one; and in the existence of three sectors of production: consumption/tradable sector, resi-
dential structures sector, and housing/non-tradable sector. The housing sector supplies new
non-tradable houses in the economy by combining residential structures and land where land
is a fixed factor of production and is subject to a law of motion as in Davis and Heathcote
(2005).
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals with finite lives and age
j ∈ {1, ..., J}. The utility function in period t of a newborn individual is a CES utility function
over consumption of housing services (xjt) and non-housing consumption goods (c
j
t):
J∑
j=1
βj−1u(cjt+j−1, x
j
t+j−1) =
J∑
j=1
βj−1
(
((1− θ)(cjt+j−1)
ε−1
ε + θ(xjt+j−1)
ε−1
ε )
ε
ε−1
)1− 1
σ
1− 1
σ
where xjt = f
j
t + h
j
t is housing services, f
j
t being services coming from renting a house, and
hjt being housing capital (services coming from owning). Renting and owning are perfect
substitutes. I assume that one unit of housing capital generates one unit of services, xjt = h
j
t .
cjt is non-housing consumption.
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2.1.2 Housing Capital and Housing Services
An individual must fulfill in advance at least a minimum downpayment requirement to buy
(and thus own) a house. This downpayment requirement is given by a fraction γt of the
value of the house. The remaining cost can be financed by borrowing against the house, with
(1− γt) giving the maximum loan-to-value ratio. Housing capital is subject to some degree of
indivisibility. This is modeled by assuming a minimum size of housing investment, h
¯
.
An individual can rent housing services as an alternative to becoming a home-owner. Rent-
ing housing services has two advantages over owning: first, it allows individuals to consume
housing services and thus avoid the downpayment requirement; and second, rented houses are
not subject to the same indivisibility as owner-occupied housing.
The price of one unit of housing services in terms of consumption goods is denoted by
rft p
h
t , where p
h
t is the price of a house in terms of consumption and r
f
t represents the fraction
of that price that an individual has to pay for renting.
Housing capital depreciates at rate δh. But rented houses depreciate at a rate δf , where
δf > δh. This difference in depreciation costs is a result of a moral hazard problem in rental
markets since renters decide the intensity at which they make use of the house they rent.
This moral hazard problem affects the market rate for rental services and this additional cost
involved is paid by the renters as a premium.
2.1.3 Income Dynamics
The life of each individual consists of a working period and a retirement period. An exoge-
nously given mandatory retirement age, denoted by j∗, determines the age at which households
retire. Individuals are endowed with one unit of working time in each period of their working
lives which they supply inelastically. An age-j individual’s unit of working time is transformed
into zj efficiency units of labor, and this value depends on age but is constant over time. Each
unit of effective labor is paid the wage rate ωt. This specification allows for individuals to
differ both across and within generations. At any point in time, the average productivity level
is fixed at unity. The measure of the entire population is also normalized at unity.
During the retirement period (j > j∗) households receive a retirement pension, bj, until
the end of their lives. The retirement pensions are paid through the social security system
and collected from income taxes on labor.
Another source of income comes through individuals’ asset holdings. Individuals accu-
mulate wealth because of life-cycle reasons and to collect the downpayment required to buy
a house. Individuals choose between three assets to accumulate wealth: housing, business
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capital, and deposits at financial institutions.
From a household’s perspective, deposits at financial institutions and business capital are
equivalent and a zero-profit condition guarantees that the rates of return on these assets
are equalized. As a result, the sum of deposits at financial institutions and business capital
constitute a single financial asset, denoted ajt .
Homeowners also receive rents from the proportion of total land they have and is needed
for new residential development. This proportion of land is exogenously given in each period
from the point of view of homeowners. The amount of land they have is a proportion of their
housing stock. For a more detailed explanation of this point see Appendix A.
2.2 Financial Institutions
Financial institutions receive individuals’ deposits and make use of it for three activities: to
finance loans issued to homeowners, purchase residential capital, and borrow/lend in interna-
tional capital markets. Financial institutions use the same linear technology as homeowners
to produce housing services, which they rent out to individuals who do not own a house.
Financial institutions borrow from/lend to abroad through the possibility of accessing inter-
national capital markets given a fixed interest rate, r∗t . They have to satisfy the demand for
credit from individuals at this interest rate.
Financial institutions, just as homeowners, receive rents from the amount of land that
they have available for residential investment.. This amount is proportional to the stock of
housing they buy for renting. See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of this point.
2.3 Technology
2.3.1 Residential Structures and Consumption Sector
Output by residential structures and the consumption sector is produced using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology in each sector:
f i(Kit , N
i
t ) = Ai(K
i
t)
αi(N it )
1−αi
where i ∈ {c, s} refers to a specific sector, and c refers to consumption and s to the
residential structures sector. Ai is a technology parameter, K
i
t is the total amount of business
capital used in each sector and N it represents the share of the working population employed
in each sector. The capital factor shares, αi, are different for each sector with the residential
structures sector being more labor intensive, αs < αc. In each period the stock of business
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capital depreciates at a rate δk. The price of residential structures in terms of the consumption
good, which is normalized at unity, is equal to pst .
I assume perfect mobility of factors between sectors such that wages (ωt) and the price for
business capital (rkt ) are equal in both sectors.
2.3.2 Housing Sector
I am following Davis and Heathcote (2005) in modeling houses. I assume that a constant
acreage of new land suitable for residential investment is sold by homeowners and financial
institutions to the firms producing houses. In order to produce new houses residential invest-
ment must be combined with land. Homeowners and financial institutions own an amount
of the acreage of land proportional to the housing stock they own. In each period one new
acreage unit of land appears and is sold to firms. This acreage is normalized to one.
Real estate developers combine new residential structures with newly-availabe land to
produce new houses according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
fh(Xst , Lt) = (X
s
t )
1−φ(Lt)φ
where Xst is the total amount of residential structures used in the production of new houses
and Lt represents the amount of land employed. The share of land in the production of new
houses is denoted by φ. The price of a new house and the price of land, both in terms of
consumption good, are represented by pht and p
l
t, respectively.
2.4 Government Expenditure
τy is a proportional tax rate on labor income and the return on financial assets. In each
period the entire proceeds from taxation on financial assets is used to finance government
expenditures. The entire proceeds from taxation on labor income is given back to individuals
as pensions when they are retired. The government thus maintains a balanced budget every
period.
2.5 The Household’s Decision Problem
Households decide on the amount of consumption (cjt), housing services (x
j
t), the housing
capital stock for the next period (hj+1t+1) and the amount of financial assets (a
j+1
t+1) by solving
this problem:
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vjt (at, ht; i) = max{cjt ,xjt ,hj+1t+1 ,aj+1t+1}
{
u(ct, xt) + βv
j+1
t+1 (at+1, ht+1; i)
}
(1)
s.t. ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + at+1 + p
h
t ht+1 ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + (1 + (1− τy)rat )at + (1− δh)pht ht + pltl(ht, ht+1) (2)
at+1 ≥ −(1− γt)pht ht+1 (3)
ht ≥ h
¯
otherwise ht = 0 (4)
xjt = f
j
t + h
j
t (5)
Equation (2) is the budget constraint. The term pltl(ht, ht+1) in the budget constraint
represents that households own land in this economy. Households have an amount of land
proportional to the amount of their housing capital.5 Equation (3) is the borrowing constraint.
Equation (4) is a constraint for the minimum house size available in the housing market.
Equation (5) is the value of housing services.
So, in this environment owning is preferred to renting because of three reasons: first, there
is a preferential tax treatment for saving in housing rather than in financial assets; second,
owning a house allows households to borrow using their housing stock as collateral; and third,
the depreciation rate of a rented house is higher than for a house owned, as it is explained in
Section 2.1.2..
2.6 The Decision Problem of Financial Institutions
Financial intermediaries issue loans in each period and buy residential capital using the pro-
ceeds from deposits they accept and by accessing international capital markets. They have
access to the international capital markets through a bond at an international interest rate.
They receive payments from rental accommodations, from selling land to the housing sector,
and receive the interest on loans issued. They also pay interests on deposits and international
bonds. The problem of a new financial institution in period t is as follows:
5An explanation of how households hold the proportion of land relative to their homes is offered in Appendix
A.
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Ψ (Ft, Bt, At, Kt) = max{Ft+1,Bt+1,At+1,Kt+1}
{
rft p
h
t Ft + p
l
tl(Ft) +X
A
t +
+rktKt −XKt − phtXft −XBt +
1
1 + rt
Ψ (Ft+1, Bt+1, At+1, Kt+1)}
s.t. XKt + p
h
tX
f
t +X
B
t ≤ rft pht Ft + pltl(Ft) + XAt + rktKt (6)
XAt = At+1 − (1 + rat )At
XBt = Bt+1 − (1 + r∗t )Bt
Xft = Ft+1 − (1− δf )Ft
XKt = Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt
where F is the amount of houses rented to households, A is the deposits made by house-
holds, B is the international borrowing/lending and K is the business capital rented to firms.
From this problem I get the dynamics for the rental price:
rft p
h
t = (1− φ)[(1 + rt)pht−1 − (1− δf )pht ]
and the zero-profit condition: rt = r
∗
t = r
a
t = r
k
t .
2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
I am interested in the transition of this model since I want to replicate a trade deficit together
with borrowing from abroad as it was the case for the U.S. during the period under study.
To replicate both facts at the same time, it is necessary to evaluate the transition since in
a steady state, and without any kind of exogenous growth, a country will be paying debt
interest through exports with a small enough international interest rate. For a definition of
the steady-state competitive equilibrium see Appendix B.
Denote q = {at, ht, i}, q ∈ Q.
Definition A competitive equilibrium for a given government policy, τy, downpay-
ment requirement, γt, and an age-dependent measure of agents type, λj(q), is a collection
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of relative prices
{
pht , p
s
t , p
l
t, r
f
t , rt, wt
}
, a collection of functions for the household problem{
vjt (q), c
j
t(q), f
j
t (q), h
j
t(q), a
j
t(q)
}
, a value function for financial institutions Ψ (Ft, Bt, At, Kt),
and aggregate quantities for the whole economy
{
Y ct , Y
h
t , Y
s
t , X
s
t , Lt, K
c
t , K
s
t , N
c
t , N
s
t , Ft, Bt, At
}
such that:
1. Inputs are priced competitively every period.
2. Given τy, γt and prices, the functions
{
vjt (q), c
j
t(q), f
j
t (q), h
j
t(q), a
j
t(q)
}
solve the dynamic
program in the household problem.
3. Given prices and the function Ψ (Ft, Bt, At, Kt), {Ft+1, Bt+1, At+1, Kt+1}, solves the fi-
nancial institutions’ problem.
4. Individual and aggregate decisions are consistent: Ct =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
cjtdλj(q), Ht =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
hjtdλj(q),
Ft =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
f jt dλj(q), At =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
ajtdλj(q).
5. The government maintains a balanced budget every period:
Gt + bt =
J∑
j=1
∫
Q
[
τywz
j
t + τyra
j
t
]
dλj(q)
where bt =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
bjtdλj(q) = τywtN t.
6. Labor market clears every period: N ct +N
s
t = N t.
7. Capital market clears every period: Kct +K
s
t = Kt.
8. Land market clears every period: Lt = Lt.
9. Residential structures market clears every period: Xst = Y
s
t .
10. Housing market clears every period:
Y ht = X
h
t +X
f
t
where Xht = Ht+1 − (1− δh)Ht.
11. Trade balance is determined every period:
TBt = Y
c
t − Ct −Xkt −Gt
where Xkt = Kt+1 − (1− δk)Kt.
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12. Net foreign asset position is determined in every period:
Bt+1 = TBt + (1 + r
∗
t )Bt
2.7.1 Characterization
The price for structures becomes:
pst =
Ac
As
ααcc (1− αc)1−αc
ααss (1− αs)1−αs
(
wt
rt + δk
)αc−αs
From this equation, after a shock to the international interest rate, the effect on the price
of structures depends on the difference between the capital shares of the consumption sector
and the residential structures sector (αc−αs). As it will be shown in the calibration section, it
is true for the U.S. economy that the residential structures sector is more labor intensive than
the consumption sector. This means that after an exogenous decrease in the international
interest rate, wages will increase, since labor becomes relatively scarce, and as a consequence
of the bigger capital share in the consumption sector, this will imply an increase in the price
of residential structures.
Housing prices become:
pht =
p1−φst p
φ
lt
(1− φ)1−φ φφ
From this equation for housing prices it can be inferred that after a positive shock (interest
rate and downpayment requirement) to the demand for housing, an increase in the demand
for land will occur and, given the fixed supply of land in the economy each period, the price
of land will increase. Both the increase in the price of structures and the increase in the price
for land will increase housing prices in this model.
3 Calibration
My calibration strategy closely follows Gervais (2002) and Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2008).
The benchmark model is calibrated to the U.S. economy as a closed economy in the initial
steady state. After the shocks I allow the economy to have access to international borrowing
and lending and to have a trade balance different from zero. Thus, the U.S. economy becomes
a small open economy during the transition. I present the calibration of my benchmark
economy in the following order: demographics and labor income distribution, technology, and
preferences and market arrangements.
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I need to perform the calibration of parameters associated with preferences (β, θ, σ, ε), the
income tax rate (τy), the downpayment fraction (γt) in the initial steady state, and parameters
associated with technology (Ac, Ac, αc, αs, φ) as well as depreciation rates (δh, δf , δk). The
distribution of productivity levels within and across generations also needs to be specified.
The U.S. economy in 1994 is the target for the calibration of the initial steady state.
3.1 Demographics and Labor Income Distribution
A model period is taken to correspond to one full year. Individuals are assumed to live for
J = 60 model periods. One can think of members of a new generation as being born at real-
life age 24 (model period one) and having an average life expectancy of 83 years (60 model
periods). The retirement age is set at age 63 (model period 40).
The distribution of productivity levels (zj) governs labor income. I calibrate this process
using the CPS survey for 1994. More precisely, I calculate the mean labor income for each
quintile in the data at each age and assign this value directly to the five individuals making
up the population in the model. The normalized labor income profile for each individual, each
representing a quintile, is shown in Figure 6.
The retirement age is obtained using the same data. The median labor income for the
entire population becomes zero at age 63 (model age 40). When individuals become retired
they start to draw their pensions collected from taxes on income over their working life.
3.2 Technology
I need to construct measures of output by the consumption sector and by the residential
sector, capital, the stock of houses and their investment counterparts (Y c, phY h, K, ph(H +
F ), Xk, ph(Xh+Xf )). I use data from the National Income and Product Accounts (henceforth
NIPA) and the Fixed Assets Tables (henceforth FAT), both from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Capital is defined as the sum of non-residential private fixed assets plus the stock of
inventories plus consumer durables. Investment in capital, Xk, is defined accordingly.6 ph(H+
F ) is private residential stock in the data and ph(Xh +Xf ) is private residential investment.
Output in the consumption sector is defined as labor income plus income from non-residential
capital, Y c = F (Kc, N c) = wN c + rKc = C + Ik + G, output in the residential sector is
labor income plus income from non-residential capital plus land income Y h = F (Xs, Lc) =
6I include net exports in my measure of capital investment since the benchmark economy is a closed
economy.
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wN s + rKs + plL = Ih + If , and total output is defined as the sum of output from each final
sector, Y = Y c + phY h, or measured GDP minus imputed housing services.7 I do not make
any imputation to output for government owned capital since my focus is only on privately
held wealth.
The business capital share for the residential structures sector is αs = 0.132, and I take
this value from Davis and Heathcote (2005). I also take from Davis and Heathcote (2005) the
land share in new housing, φ = 0.106. Calculations in Davis and Heathcote (2005) are in the
same context as the model presented here.
I proceed as Cooley and Prescott (1995) and calculate the implied share of capital in
output in the consumption sector, which is αc = 0.26. The capital-output ratio (K/Y ) is 1.66
and the housing-output ratio ((ph(H +F ))/Y ) is 1.07.8 I set the depreciation rate of capital,
δk, so that it matches the investment to capital ratio in NIPA, δk = 0.12. The implied steady
state interest rate is 3.4 percent, in line with similar calibrations presented by, for example,
Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2008).
The value of the implied capital share in the consumption sector may seem low, but it
is not very different from typical values in the literature when given as a function of GDP
instead of output. GDP is output plus the imputed value of housing services: GDP =
Y + (r + δh)p
hH + rfphF . The capital-GDP ratio (K/GDP ) is 1.53, the housing-GDP ratio
(Kph(H + F ))/GDP is 0.98, and the aggregate ratio (K + ph(H + F ))/GDP is 2.51. The
resulting share of capital income to GDP is 31.52 percent, only slightly lower than the value
estimated by Prescott (1986).
The technology level for consumption sector (Ac) and residential structures sector (As)
is such that As < Ac as suggested by evidence. I set Ac = 2 and As = 0.9 to replicate the
aggregate ratio (K + ph(H + F ))/GDP = 2.51 and the housing-output ratio of 1.07.
The minimum house size is such that the homeownership rate in the economy is 64 per-
cent as in the U.S. economy in 1994.9 With minimum size equal to 1.4775 for owner-occupied
houses and given a downpayment fraction of 20 percent, the model replicates the above home-
ownership rate for the U.S..
I borrow the values for the depreciation rates from Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2010), given
that my benchmark economy is a closed economy and those values are consistent with general
7C is output in the consumption sector minus the sum of investment in physical capital and government
expenditures.
8All figures I report are averages in NIPA/FAT for the sample period 1954-1994.
9Data from United States Statistical Abstract and Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) for
1994.
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equilibrium. The values are δh = 0.0424, δf = 0.0483, and δk = 0.12. I also borrow an income
tax rate τy equal to 0.2 from Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2008).
3.3 Preferences and Market Arrangements
The value of the discount factor (β) is chosen to make the capital-output ratio equal to 1.66.
It should be noted that capital refers to the total amount of capital which includes housing
and business capital, and that output corresponds to the sum of output goods and the value
of housing services. The discount factor which achieves the desired capital-output ratio is
0.9757.
The share of housing services in total expenditures is controlled by θ. I set this parameter
in order to replicate the ratio ph(H + F )/C in the U.S. economy. In the data this ratio is
equal to 1.4, and the θ that matches it is 0.0765. With this value for θ I also replicate the
ratio ph(H + F )/GDP in the U.S. of 0.98.
I set the risk aversion parameter in the utility function at σ = 0.5, since this is the
value usually employed in the business cycle literature. This parameter determines the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution. The last parameter referred to preferences is ε. This
value determines the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between consumption goods
and housing services. Most of the literature uses a Cobb-Douglas utility function in order
to reconcile the differences found in the literature for this parameter above and below one.10
Recent studies that rely on structural analysis in order to estimate those parameters suggest
that housing services and consumption goods are complements. See, for example, Bajari et
al. (2010) or Li et al. (2009). So I set this parameter at a value slightly smaller than one and
choose a conservative value of ε = 0.9 as in Gete (2010).
I require a minimum downpayment of 20 percent for the initial steady state. Thus individ-
uals can borrow up to 80 percent of the value of the house. While in reality households may
be able to acquire houses with lower downpayment, it is also the case that these households
face higher marginal borrowing costs (including a higher interest rate and the purchase of
mortgage insurance). To keep the model tractable, the downpayment parameter is the same
for all consumers and the borrowing rate is not a function of γt.
All parameter values for the benchmark calibration are summarized in Table 3.
10See Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) for a discussion.
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4 Results
4.1 The Benchmark Economy
The typical behavior of individuals in the initial steady state is similar to the one in Gervais
(2002). I also break it down into three categories of individuals: poor and lower middle class
(first and second quintiles), middle-class (third quintile) and upper-middle class (fourth and
fifth quintiles). The behavior of poor and lower middle-class individuals is quite simple: they
rarely own their home, they set up cooperatives11 in which a small proportion of households
(around 17-20% in the first quintile and 50-55% in the second) own the house in which they
live, and always consume a small amount of housing services. Middle-class individuals initially
consume small amounts of housing services and consumption goods in order to save enough
to eventually become homeowners. When they become homeowners, at age 33, they move
into the smallest possible house. At that time, these individuals are constrained both by
the downpayment and the minimum house size constraints. During their first few years as
homeowners, they use their extra income both to increase consumption and pay off their
mortgages. As they get wealthier, they eventually move into bigger houses.
The consumption level of young upper middle-class individuals is also constrained as they
accumulate wealth to cover the downpayment on a house. After 2-3 years of accumulating
wealth, at age 29-30, they move into the largest house their downpayment allows. Unlike lower
middle-class individuals, they are not constrained by the minimum house size: they keep living
in the largest house their downpayment allows for 2-3 years. After this constrained period,
they increase housing services and consumption.
All individuals accumulate assets during their productive years which they deplete to
provide for consumption once retired instead of having a retirement pension. Homeowners
thus partially revert to debt financing their house (rather than holding the entire asset as
equity) in order to consume goods as well as housing services during the last few periods of
their life. Without uncertainty, all individuals die with zero net worth.
4.2 Experiment
I evaluate the behavior of the model after a permanent and unanticipated shock to the inter-
national interest rate and to the downpayment requirement to buy a house. I compute the
transition of the model and analyze the joint effect of these two shocks happening once and
11Detailed explanation in Appendix A.
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for all. Since the model is calibrated to the U.S. economy, the size of the shocks is taken from
data for this country.
The initial steady state is a closed economy where the trade balance and borrowing from
abroad are equal to zero. The final steady state that the economy reaches is then computed,
where the country is borrowing from abroad and paying debt interests by exporting goods.
At this stage, the economy is holding a sustainable level of debt. Thereafter, I compute the
transition between these two points and look at the behavior of different variables. A detailed
explanation of the computational procedure can be found in Appendix A.
I lower the shock for the international interest rate from the value obtained in the initial
calibration to a new value of 0.6 percentage points smaller. This value is the mean of the
annual decreases in the federal founds effective rate of the U.S. between 1990 and 2003.12,13
For the downpayment requirement, the shock is the mean of the annual decreases in the
U.S. between 1994 and 2003. This will imply a fall from its initial steady state value from 0.2
to 0.18. The magnitude of the change is in line with the evidence presented in the introduction.
Since both shocks happen once and for all, the boom period in the model corresponds to
the first period of the transition. Also, given that the size of the shocks comes from the annual
average variation, my quantitative targets for this experiment are the annual average changes
observed in data over the boom period.
4.2.1 The Joint Effect
In this section I investigate the effect of both shocks taking place at the same time. Figure 7
shows how both shocks occur once and for all.
Both shocks drive up the demand for housing services - at both margins. The interest rate
decrease makes, on the one hand, mortgages14 cheaper, and, on the other hand, makes it more
attractive to save in a house than in financial assets. The downpayment shock allows easier
access to the housing market for households that would otherwise rent, and makes it possible
for previous owners to buy bigger houses.
12Kiyotaki et al. (2011) set a shock of 1 percentage point decrease in the international interest rate with
no particular focus in any interest rate series for the U.S. Garriga et al. (2012) do their own calculations
and choose a path for the world interest rate that would be equivalent to an average annual decrease of 0.3
percentage points from 1990 to 2004. In the case of Ferrero (2011), the decrease found in the data for the
long-term real interest rate would be equivalent to 0.8 percentage points between 2000 and 2004.
13I choose the federal founds effective rate that being the reference rate.
14The model presented can be rewritten to include a simple mortgage into the definition of financial assets.
See Gervais (2002).
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The first result is plotted in Figure 8 and shows that the model replicates the evolution of
housing prices and the current account balance. The model generates a housing prices boom
in the period of the shock of 3.4% together with a current account deficit. The mean annual
increase between mid-90s and 2007 in the U.S. data was also 3.4%. The model predicts a large
current account deficit (around a 10.97% of GDP) compared with the size of the shocks in the
period of the boom since there is no adjustment cost and all variables move freely after both
shocks. The bust in housing prices after the first period of the transition happens together
with a reduction in the current account deficit, but without turning into a surplus.
Figure 9 shows how the model is able to replicate the behavior of the extensive margin
increase. The increase in the homeownership rate in the boom period is 0.79%, in line with
the average annual increase of the homeownership in the U.S. economy since 1994 (0.5%). It
is interesting to note that after the boom in the homeownership rate, there is also a decrease
in this variable during some of the bust periods. This happens because there are two effects at
work after both shocks: first, houses are valued more highly as collateral; and second, houses
are more expensive. Households at the margin decide to invest in housing when prices go up
because they can use their houses as collateral. After the boom period, the first effect starts
to drive down the homeownership rate (the value of the collateral starts to decrease), but after
some periods housing prices start to fall and it is this second effect (houses becoming cheaper
as time goes by) that drives homeownership up again. Notice that this happens without a
reversal in the shocks, especially without a reversal in the downpayment requirement to buy
a house.
The housing stock increases around 1.7% in the period of he boom and it is still increasing,
at a smaller rate, after some periods (0.5% in the first year after the boom period). In the
U.S. economy the average annual growth rate of net residential stock was 2.6% between 1994
and 2007; in the bust period (2008-2012) this rate fell to 0.18% according to the data.15
The increase in non-housing consumption is due to two reasons: the increase in the value
of the collateral, and the decrease in the interest rate. As it can be seen, the increase in non-
housing consumption is consistent with the average annual increase in personal consumption
expenditures for the U.S. economy, and is around a 3%.16 The overshooting in non-housing
consumption is related to the small open economy assumption, but the quantitative response
in the boom period of non-housing consumption is also determined by the increase in the value
of the collateral. Thus, after the boom in non-housing consumption there is a bust because
of two reasons: the debt must be repaid, since it is a small open economy borrowing from
15Data from the Fixed Assets Tables, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
16Data for Personal Consumption Expenditures in NIPA tables.
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abroad in the period of the boom; and, because of a decrease in the value of the collateral,
since housing prices start to decrease after the boom in the first period.
Figure 10 represents the ability of an open economy model to replicate the pattern observed
in the data. An open economy moves resources from the tradable to the non-tradable sector
(labor in the construction sector), thus increasing the production of the non-tradable good
(housing production). Since there is an increase in the demand for non-housing consumption,
the economy has to satisfy this increase in the demand by running a trade deficit. Gete (2010)
also points out this result after a positive shock to the demand for housing.
In Figure 11, I show the decomposition of housing prices together with the rent-to-price
ratio. As it can be seen, the price of structures increases once and for all. This is due to
a converse result of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. After the decrease in the interest rate,
the capital-labor ratio of the economy increases, causing wages to rise. Since structures are
more labor intensive compared to the consumption sector, this increase in wages drives up
the price of structures. Land prices go up more in the period of the shock, and then start to
fall. The pressure on land is grater in the period of the shock and then decreases gradually
over time. This effect brings about house price changes that follow the same pattern. The
fact that there is a new fixed amount of land available for construction in each period (as in
Davis and Heathcote (2007)) makes housing prices demand driven.
The rent-to-price ratio decreases in the period of the boom and then increases following
the non-arbitrage condition of the financial institutions. The change in the rent-to-price ratio
is in line with what we observe in the data during the boom period. However, during the
bust the rent-to-price ratio goes in the opposite direction than borne out in the data. The
intuition behind this result arises from the non-arbitrage condition for the rental price of
financial institutions. The non-arbitrage condition is a function of the international interest
rate and housing prices. After the decrease in the international interest rate the rent-to-price
ratio collapses, but afterwards the evolution of housing prices governs the evolution of the
rent-to-price ratio.
It is important to note that the bust happens neither with a reversal in the interest rate
after the boom period, nor with a reversal in the downpayment requirement. As the data show,
interest rates remained low during the bust period, but also the downpayment requirement to
buy a house was reversed throughout the bust years (see Favilukis et al. (2013)). A branch
of the literature pointed out how the increasing difficulties to borrow by households could
have driven a bust in credit that precipitated the Great Recession of 2007-08 (see Huo and
Rıos-Rull (2014)), a mechanism of which this model abstracts. The housing bust in this model
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does take place but is quantitatively at odds with the US data. As for homeownership rate
and the price of structures over the bust period the model does not account for the data in
the U.S. However, a reversal in the downpayment requirement and a recession of the economy
after the boom (with low interest rates maintained) would worsen the bust predictions of the
model for housing variables and would predict a decrease in the homeownership rate and the
price of structures during the bust in line with the data.
Figure 12 shows what happens to all the housing variables taken together and how the
model is able to generate a boom and a bust in the housing market. The housing stock shows
the biggest increase in the boom period, thereby increasing the pressure on land and increasing
housing prices, and as a result, the economy moves labor to the production of structures in
this period. After the boom period, the pressure on land starts to ease off, thus decreasing
housing prices and the production of new houses in the economy. It is at this stage that the
bust hits the economy and this is the mechanism behind the overshooting in housing prices.
The increase in housing production, i.e. investment in housing, puts pressure on land prices
replicating the overshooting in this variable. For this reason housing prices drop to a level
above the initial steady state. The investment in housing, in a steady state with a lower
interest rate and downpayment, is bigger than the investment in housing at the initial steady
state. Once all new houses have been produced, the depreciation of a bigger stock of housing
must be built in a plot of land of the same size each period.
Finally, Figure 13 shows how, during the bust period, there is a reversal in the trend of the
current account balance but a current account deficit still remains. In the period of the shocks
the model predicts a big current account deficit, and a big deficit (around 2.7% of GDP) still
exists in the first period of the bust and during some periods ahead. The net foreign asset
position is deteriorating until the final steady state is reached. Moreover, and consistent with
the evidence for this period, the bust happens without a reversal in interest rates.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have studied the transition of a life-cycle heterogeneous agents small open
economy model in which the economy goes to a new steady state with lower interest rates and
a lower downpayment requirement to buy a house.
The model is able to replicate some important facts of the U.S. economy between the
mid-90s and 2007 such as the boom in non-housing consumption, the increase in the extensive
margin demand for housing in this period, and the current account deficit together with
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borrowing from abroad during the transition. Two characteristics of the model contribute
to successfully replicating those facts: one is that demand drives up housing prices in the
economy, and the other is the life-cycle heterogeneous agents structure. Households want to
build up their desired stock of housing and this pushes up housing prices. The model is also
able to replicate (qualitatively) the bust period after 2007. The bust in housing prices occurs
when there is a fall in demand. The degree of heterogeneity in the economy allows some
households to access the housing because of the decrease in the downpayment requirement
to buy a house. The decreasing interest rates allow households to get cheaper credit for
consumption due to the increasing market value of their homes.
The model generates a surge of housing and non-housing consumption at the beginning of
the transition. Everybody prefers an expensive house in order to have access to credit. When
the pressure of new housing investment on land decreases, the value of houses drops, debt
must be repaid, and a bust takes place in the housing market. Therefore, the current account
deficit decreases with low interest rates maintained, as it seems to be case for the U.S. after
the bust in housing markets. It is true that the downpayment requirement in the U.S. after
the bust in housing markets became higher, but given the intuition of the model, this positive
shock to the downpayment requirement would imply a sharper bust in the housing variables
presented here even with low interest rates.
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Table 1: Loan to Value Ratio (LTV).
Year LTV
1995 78.4
1998 86.2
2003 94.4
Source: Duca et al. (2011).
Table 2: Model Parameters.
Parameter Value
β 0.9757
θ 0.0765
σ 0.5
ε 0.9
γ 0.2
h
¯
1.4775
Ac 2
As 0.9
αc 0.2616
αs 0.132
φ 0.106
δk 0.117
δh 0.0424
δf 0.0483
τy 0.2
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Figure 1: Residential Investment.
Source: OECD, Eurostat.
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Figure 2: Real House Prices (% Change).
Source: OECD.
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Figure 3: Homeownership Rates.
Source: USA, US Census Bureau. Spain, OECD, Banco de Espan˜a, and Eurostat.
Note: Spanish homeownership rate from data for 1990 (77.8), 1996 (76), 1998 (82.57), 2003 (85.3), and
applying Eurostat growth rates from 2007 up ahead.
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Figure 4: Current Account (% GDP).
Source: OECD.
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Figure 5: Long-term Interest Rate on Government Bonds.
Source: OECD.
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Figure 6: Labor Income.
Labor income process for each quintile.
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).
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Figure 7: Interest Rate and Downpayment Shock.
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Figure 8: Negative Correlation between House Prices and Current Account Balance.
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Figure 9: Extensive Margin and Non-Housing Consumption.
31
Figure 10: International Interest Rate Shock and the Housing Boom.
32
Figure 11: Housing Prices and Land Price.
33
Figure 12: Housing Market.
34
Figure 13: Housing Boom and International Interest Rates.
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Appendix A: Computational Procedures
The first thing I do is to calculate the initial steady state and the final one. The computational
procedure for the transition is based on Heer and Maussner (2008).
Households Own Land
The budget constraint is reduced with some assumptions. The first one is relative to the
amount of land households hold in the economy. I assume that households have an amount
of the total land in the economy proportional to their housing stock, and they receive this
amount of land exogenously each period. To have an intuition of this assumption think of
the steady state. In each period households have to cover the amount of housing capital
depreciated and construct it on the new plot of land that they receive in that period. So,
rents from land are received by households in a proportional amount to their housing stock.
This assumption makes it possible to have land in the economy owned by individuals.
I make use of the Cobb-Douglas production function to derive the relationship between
land and the housing stock. From the marginal product of land I get:
pltl(ht, ht+1) = φp
h
t (ht+1 − (1− δh)ht)
Using this expression the budget constraint becomes:
ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + at+1 + p
h
t (1− φ)ht+1 ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + (1 + (1− τy)rat )at + (1− δh)pht (1− φ)ht
Now, I add the term pht−1(1 − φ)ht to both sides of the budget constraint. Rearranging I
get:
ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + at+1 + p
h
t (1− φ)ht+1 ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + at + pht−1(1−φ)ht + (1− τy)rat at− δhpht (1−φ)ht + (pht − pht−1)(1−φ)ht
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Voluntary Equity
In order to compute the equilibrium of the model, it is convenient to reformulate the household
problem. Define voluntary equity as the wealth held less the proportional amount of land,
yjt ≡ ajt + pht−1(1− φ)hjt . So:
ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + yt+1 ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + yt + (1− τy)rat at − δhpht (1− φ)ht + (pht − pht−1)(1− φ)ht
Where the term (pht −pht−1)(1−φ)ht refers to the capital gains made by a household because
of a change in housing prices from one period to the next.
The Borrowing Constraint
The borrowing constraint is:
at+1 ≥ −(1− γt)pht ht+1
which, making use of the definition for voluntary equity, can be written in the following
way:
yt+1 + p
h
t φht+1 ≥ γtpht ht+1
becoming a constraint on next period’s net worth:
yt+1 ≥ (γt − φ)pht ht+1
Solution Method
I closely follow the solution method in Gervais (2002). The state variables for the household
problem are the earnings process, the quintile to which households belong, and voluntary eq-
uity, {zj, i, yjt}. With this reformulation, I deal with one state variable. This greatly simplifies
the problem imposed by the endogenous liquidity constraint in the solution of the household
problem.
The household problem can be broken down into intra-period and inter-temporal decisions.
The inter-temporal decision consists of choosing the amount of savings to carry over to the
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next period. Once the inter-temporal decision is made, households choose the amount of
composite goods and housing services to consume during the current period, as well as the
composition of savings carried over from the previous period.
This possibility derives from the fact that only one state variable is needed to describe
the situation of an age-j individual with productivity level zj. This state variable is today’s
net worth or, alternatively, yesterday’s savings. Without uncertainty, the make up of the
composition of today’s savings is irrelevant since the same composition will be the result
whether the decision is made today or tomorrow. Hence, the only information needed as an
individual enters a period is the total amount of savings carried over from the previous period,
as opposed to its split between financial assets and housing. In other words, today’s amount
of savings is chosen knowing that its composition will be optimized tomorrow.
These points become obvious in the following recursive formulation of the households’
problem. Let vjt (yt; i) denote the value of behaving optimally from period j until period J for
an individual who enters period j with net worth yt, productivity level z, and belonging to
quintile i, in each period of time t. Given a net worth position at age j; a household chooses
the next period’s net worth to maximize total future discounted utility. The value function
of an age-j individual is defined as:
vjt (yt; i) ≡ max{yj+1t+1∈Γ}
{
Gj(yt, yt+1; i) + βv
j+1
t+1 (yt+1; i)
}
where Γ is the feasible set from which tomorrow’s net worth is chosen. The return function
of an age-j individual, Gj; is defined as the maximum utility level a household can achieve
given today’s and tomorrow’s level of net worth. In other words, the return function is the
one which solves the following intra-temporal problem:
Gj(yt, yt+1; i) ≡ max{cjt ,xjt ,fjt ,hjt ,ajt}
{u(ct, xt)}
s.t. ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + yt+1 + δhp
h
t (1− φ)ht ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + yt + (1− τy)rat at + (pht − pht−1)(1− φ)ht
yt = at + p
h
t−1(1− φ)ht
xt = ft + ht
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yt ≥ (γt−1 − φ)pht−1ht
ht ≥ h
¯
otherwise ht = 0
For the results presented in this paper, I use 200 grid points for voluntary equity and linear
interpolation in order to get more accuracy (the grid points are not equally spaced to maximize
efficiency). Households in each quintile are born with zero financial assets (a1t = 0 ∀i, ∀t) and
zero housing stock (h1t = 0 ∀i, ∀t).
Different Households in the Economy
This economy is populated by three types of households.
Renters: Households without enough net worth to buy the minimum house size are forced
to rent; other households prefer to save for a longer period of time to attain the desired level
of owned housing by renting for some time before buying a house. In this case, they solve the
following problem:
G(yt, yt+1; i) = max{cjt ,fjt ,ajt}
{u(ct, ft)}
s.t. ct + r
f
t p
h
t ft + yt+1 ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + yt + (1− τy)rat at
yt = at
yt ≥ 0
Home owners: Households with enough net worth to purchase a house bigger than the
minimum house size solve:
Gj(yt, yt+1; i) = max{cjt ,hjt ,ajt}
{u(ct, ht)}
s.t. ct + yt+1 + δhp
h
t (1− φ)ht ≤
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≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + yt + (1− τy)rat at + (pht − pht−1)(1− φ)ht
yt = at + p
h
t−1(1− φ)ht
yt ≥ (γt−1 − φ)pht−1ht
ht > h
¯
Households in the margin (Cooperatives): There are some households with enough
resources to buy the minimum house size and they would be constrained by this election. Here
I make the assumption of allowing these households to make a convex combination between
the minimum house size and the amount of housing services they would rent. The problem
with the non-convexity of the minimum house size is that, along the transition and for the
calibrated model, I always find some individuals switching from owning the minimum house
size to renting making it impossible to clear the housing market. This happens for a very small
fraction of individuals and could be solved by some others techniques like linear interpolation
in ages. The existence of the minimum house size is key in this model since I do not have
adjustment costs in housing capital and I want to model the homeownership rate. In my
model, without a minimum house size, all individuals would own a small fraction of housing
capital in all periods but the first one, in which they have zero assets by assumption. Because
of the preferential tax treatment and the access to credit that allows households to get credit,
owning a house is always preferred to renting. Both assumptions are in line with the available
evidence.
By assuming that households can do a convex combination between renting and owning the
minimum house, I can solve the problem of clearing the housing market and have a realistic
homeownership rate in the economy.
The problem I solve for these households is as follows:
Gj(yt, yt+1; i) = max{cjt ,xjt ,qjt ,fjt ,hjt ,ajt}
{u(ct, xt)}
s.t. ct + r
f
t p
h
t qtft + yt+1 + δhp
h
t (1− φ)(1− qt)ht ≤
≤ zi(1− τy)wt + bj>j∗t + yt + (1− τy)rat at + (pht − pht−1)(1− φ)(1− qt)ht
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yt = at + p
h
t−1(1− φ)(1− qt)ht
xt = qtft + (1− qt)ht
yt ≥ (γt−1 − φ)pht−1(1− qt)ht
ht = h
¯
No more households in the economy will do a convex combination of this kind if it is not
with the minimum house size. The reason is that they would always prefer owning to renting
in cases other than the minimum house size.
An intuition for this problem would be to consider it as cooperatives, i.e. that some
households, belonging to the same age and quintile, were allowed to establish a cooperative.
Then, only some of them would live in the house, while the others would rent. However, they
can use this house as a collateral for credit in the capital markets.
An alternative interpretation can be that households deposit their savings in a financial
intermediary and that the probability of buying a house depends on the fraction of the down-
payment deposited. If a household deposits half of the required downpayment to buy a house,
then the household is allowed to buy a house with 50% probability. If the household does not
win the lottery, it does not lose its assets. Next period he will make a new deposit and get a
new chance to buy a house.
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Appendix B: Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Denote q = {a, h, i}, q ∈ Q.
Definition A stationary competitive equilibrium for a given government policy, τy,
and downpayment requirement, γ, is a collection of relative prices
{
ph, ps, pl, rf , r, w
}
, a collec-
tion of functions for the household problem {vj(q), cj(q), f j(q), hj(q), aj(q)}, an age-dependent
measure of agents type, λj(q), a value function for financial institutions Ψ (F,B,A,K), and
aggregate quantities for the whole economy
{
Y c, Y h, Y s, Xs, L,Kc, Ks, N c, N s, F, B,A
}
such
that:
1. Inputs are priced competitively.
2. Given τy, γ and prices, the functions {vj(q), cj(q), f j(q), hj(q), aj(q)} solve the dynamic
program from the household problem.
3. Given prices and the function Ψ (F,B,A,K), {F ′, B′, A′, K ′}, solves the financial insti-
tutions’ problem.
4. Individual and aggregate decisions are consistent: C =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
cjdλj(q), H =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
hjdλj(q),
F =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
f jdλj(q), A =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
ajdλj(q).
5. The government maintains a balanced budget:
G+ b =
J∑
j=1
∫
Q
[
τywz
j + τyra
j
]
dλj(q)
where b =
∑J
j=1
∫
Q
bjdλj(q) = τywN .
6. Labor market clears: N c +N s = N .
7. Capital market clears: Kc +Ks = K.
8. Land market clears: L = L.
9. Residential structures market clears: Xs = Y s.
10. Housing market clears:
Y h = Xh +Xf
where Xh = δhH, and X
f = δfF .
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11. Trade balance is determined:
TB = Y c − C −Xk −G
where Xk = δkK.
12. Net foreign asset position is determined:
B = −
(
TB
r
)
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